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Peace The Frontier

Futures

The world of 2126 depends, above all, on two decisions: how much we regulate and cooperate (peace) and how fast we let AI advance (the frontier). Crossing them gives four futures. None is a prediction, and the atlas does not advocate any of them.

What will the world look like in 2126?

Frontier: how fast AI advances →

Peace: how much we regulate and cooperate →

How the model works

A small model simulates the century year by year. It takes two numbers between 0 and 1, peace and frontier, and computes twelve indicators: AI capability, robots, work, inequality, population, pace of science, energy, warming, power concentration and risk. It runs 200 times with parameters drawn at random within their ranges; that is why every chart shows a band, not a single line.

Each future’s page starts at its corner of the matrix, but you can move the controls and watch the numbers change.

Equations

AI capability
L(t+1)=L(t)+g(t)(1−L(t)Lmax),g(t)=[gmin+(gmax−gmin)f](1−φcrisis(t))

L is the logarithm of compute relative to 2026. It grows with the frontier f, slows near its ceiling and during crises.

Automatable tasks
A(t)=A0+(Amax−A0)L(t)nL(t)n+L50n

An S-curve: few tasks at first, half of them once capability reaches L₅₀.

Employment
E(t)=E0(1−(A(t)−A0)(1−κ)),κ=κmin+(κmax−κmin)p

Peace p increases the share of displacement offset by new tasks and policies (κ).

Inequality
G(t)=G0+a(A(t)−A0)(1−p)−b(A(t)−A0)p

Automation without rules raises it; redistribution lowers it.

Robots
R(t+1)=R(t)+rR(t)(1−R(t)max⁡(R(t),RsatA(t))),r=rmin+(rmax−rmin)f

An S-curve whose ceiling rises with automation.

Pace of science
S(t)=1+σL(t)(35+25p)

Each order of magnitude of AI speeds up science; cooperation (open science) amplifies it.

AI electricity
EIA(t)=EIA,010εL(t)(1−η)t

It grows with capability and is tempered by efficiency.

Clean energy
Q(t+1)=Q(t)+q0(12+p)(1+λlog10⁡S(t))Q(t)(1−Q(t))

An S-curve accelerated by cooperation and science.

Warming
T(t)=T0+TCRE⋅∑τ<tEm(τ)1000,Em(t)=Em0TE(t)TE01−Q(t)1−Q0+U0(1−υ)t

The IPCC TCRE relationship: warming is proportional to cumulative CO₂. Energy demand TE grows faster with more frontier.

Population
P(t)=PONU(t)(1+zONUt740)(1+μlog10⁡S(t))

The UN medium variant, shifted within its interval and adjusted for health advances.

Power concentration
Π(t)=Π0+cL(t)(1−p)2−dp

An illustrative index: more AI without peace concentrates power.

Cumulative risk of catastrophe
h(t)=hnat+hIAΔL(t)gmax(1−p)2+hconfΠ(t)100(1−p),riesgo(t)=1−e−∑τ≤th(τ)

Probability of a catastrophe killing ≥ 10% of humanity: a baseline risk plus that of fast progress without peace and that of power concentration.

Crises
χ(t)=(1−p)(12+Π(t)100),crisis(t)=1⟺χ(t)>θ

When tension χ exceeds θ a crisis of D years breaks out; it cannot repeat within 15 years (the last one was the 2020 pandemic).

Parameters

Every parameter has a central value, a range and a source. When there is no direct source, we mark it as an assumption.

SymbolWhat it isCentral valueRangeSource
gmaxMaximum yearly capability growth (orders of magnitude)0.6530.602 – 0.699Epoch AI, 2024
gminMinimum yearly growth: hardware improvement only0.130.0969 – 0.161Epoch AI, 2023
LmaxCapability ceiling (orders of magnitude above 2026)129 – 15Assumption
φSlowdown caused by a crisis0.70.5 – 0.9Assumption
A0Automatable tasks in 20260.050.02 – 0.1Eloundou, Manning, Mishkin y Rock, 2023
AmaxMaximum automatable tasks0.98—Assumption
nSteepness of the automation curve21.5 – 3Assumption
L50Capability at which half of all tasks are automated6.54.5 – 9Grace et al., 2024
E0Working-age population in employment, 20260.580.56 – 0.6Organización Internacional del Trabajo, 2025
κminDisplacement offset without peace0.30.2 – 0.4Acemoglu y Restrepo, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2019
κmaxDisplacement offset with full peace0.80.7 – 0.9Acemoglu y Restrepo, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2019
G0Global inequality in 2026 (Gini × 100)6057 – 63Milanovic, World Development, 2024
aInequality added by unregulated automation3020 – 40Assumption
bInequality corrected by redistribution2515 – 35Assumption
R0Robots in operation in 2026 (billions)0.00510.0047 – 0.0056International Federation of Robotics, 2024
rminYearly robot growth at the historical pace0.120.1 – 0.14International Federation of Robotics, 2024
rmaxMaximum yearly robot growth0.350.3 – 0.4Assumption
RsatRobots per unit of automation (billions)102 – 20Assumption
σScience speed-up per order of magnitude of AI10.5 – 1.5Assumption
EIA,0Data-center electricity in 2026 (TWh)550480 – 620Agencia Internacional de la Energía, 2025
εExtra electricity per order of magnitude of AI0.20.15 – 0.3Agencia Internacional de la Energía, 2025
ηYearly data-center efficiency gain0.020.01 – 0.04Assumption
TE0World primary energy in 2026 (EJ)620600 – 640Energy Institute, 2024
γminYearly energy-demand growth with slow AI0.0040.001 – 0.007Assumption
γmaxYearly energy-demand growth with fast AI0.0160.013 – 0.019Assumption
Q0Clean share of primary energy in 20260.190.17 – 0.21Energy Institute, 2024
q0Baseline speed of the energy transition0.050.03 – 0.08Assumption
λBoost from science to the transition0.30.1 – 0.5Assumption
Em0Fossil CO₂ emissions in 2026 (Gt)37.436 – 39Global Carbon Project, 2024
U0Land-use emissions in 2026 (Gt)4.23.2 – 5.2Global Carbon Project, 2024
υYearly decline of land-use emissions0.020.01 – 0.04Assumption
T0Warming in 2026 (°C above pre-industrial)1.41.3 – 1.5Forster et al., Earth System Science Data, 2024
TCREWarming per 1000 Gt of CO₂ (°C)0.450.27 – 0.63IPCC, 2021
zONUDeviation within the UN interval (±10% by 2100)0-1 – 1Naciones Unidas, 2024
μEffect of science on population (health)0.010 – 0.03Assumption
Π0Power concentration in 2026 (index 0–100)5040 – 60Assumption
cConcentration per order of magnitude of AI without peace63 – 9Assumption
dDeconcentration brought by peace105 – 15Assumption
hnatBaseline yearly risk (pandemics, nuclear war, natural)0.00080.0005 – 0.0011Karger et al., Forecasting Research Institute, 2023
hIAYearly risk from fast AI progress without peace0.010.006 – 0.014Karger et al., Forecasting Research Institute, 2023
hconfYearly risk from power concentration0.0040.002 – 0.006Karger et al., Forecasting Research Institute, 2023
θTension threshold that triggers a crisis0.70.6 – 0.8Assumption
DDuration of a crisis (years)53 – 8Assumption

Calibration

Before publishing, the model is checked against official figures. These are the targets and whether they are met:

  • MetPeaceful frontier temperature 2081–2100, within SSP1-2.6Model value: 2.04 °C
  • MetPause temperature 2081–2100, between SSP1-2.6 and SSP2-4.5Model value: 1.97 °C
  • MetMatrix-center temperature 2081–2100, within SSP2-4.5Model value: 2.19 °C
  • MetRace temperature 2081–2100, between SSP2-4.5 and SSP5-8.5Model value: 2.61 °C
  • MetFracture temperature 2081–2100, between SSP2-4.5 and SSP5-8.5Model value: 2.36 °C
  • MetRace and Fracture end warmer than Peaceful frontier (difference in °C)Model value: 0.32 °C
  • MetCatastrophe risk by 2100 at the center, between superforecasters (9%) and experts (20%)Model value: 17%
  • MetCatastrophe risk by 2100 in Pause, below 9%Model value: 7.9%
  • MetCatastrophe risk by 2100 in Race, above 20%Model value: 32.8%
  • MetData-center electricity in 2030 at the center, ±30% of the IEA base case (945 TWh)Model value: 1,008.48 TWh
  • MetYear half of all tasks are automated (center), between 2047 and 2116Model value: 2049
  • MetPopulation in 2100 (center) within the UN intervalModel value: 10.28
  • MetRobots 2016→2023 at the historical pace, ±15% of IFR’s 4.28 MModel value: 4.03
  • MetCompute growth in the first year at full frontier, between ×4 and ×5Model value: 4.5

The risk thresholds (Pause below 9%, Race above 20%) are an editorial choice, anchored in the estimates of superforecasters and experts in the XPT tournament.

Limits of the model

  • It does not predict: it links assumptions to consequences.
  • Temperature only counts CO₂ and does not model carbon removal, so it never falls; at most, it levels off.
  • Population does not react to catastrophes: risk is shown as a probability; the event itself is not simulated.
  • The power and inequality indices are illustrative.
  • The UN projects to 2100; after that we extend its last rate.
  • The relationships between variables are simple on purpose, so they can be read and debated.