Futures
The world of 2126 depends, above all, on two decisions: how much we regulate and cooperate (peace) and how fast we let AI advance (the frontier). Crossing them gives four futures. None is a prediction, and the atlas does not advocate any of them.
What will the world look like in 2126?
Frontier: how fast AI advances →
Peace: how much we regulate and cooperate →
How the model works
A small model simulates the century year by year. It takes two numbers between 0 and 1, peace and frontier, and computes twelve indicators: AI capability, robots, work, inequality, population, pace of science, energy, warming, power concentration and risk. It runs 200 times with parameters drawn at random within their ranges; that is why every chart shows a band, not a single line.
Each future’s page starts at its corner of the matrix, but you can move the controls and watch the numbers change.
Equations
- AI capability
L is the logarithm of compute relative to 2026. It grows with the frontier f, slows near its ceiling and during crises.
- Automatable tasks
An S-curve: few tasks at first, half of them once capability reaches L₅₀.
- Employment
Peace p increases the share of displacement offset by new tasks and policies (κ).
- Inequality
Automation without rules raises it; redistribution lowers it.
- Robots
An S-curve whose ceiling rises with automation.
- Pace of science
Each order of magnitude of AI speeds up science; cooperation (open science) amplifies it.
- AI electricity
It grows with capability and is tempered by efficiency.
- Clean energy
An S-curve accelerated by cooperation and science.
- Warming
The IPCC TCRE relationship: warming is proportional to cumulative CO₂. Energy demand TE grows faster with more frontier.
- Population
The UN medium variant, shifted within its interval and adjusted for health advances.
- Power concentration
An illustrative index: more AI without peace concentrates power.
- Cumulative risk of catastrophe
Probability of a catastrophe killing ≥ 10% of humanity: a baseline risk plus that of fast progress without peace and that of power concentration.
- Crises
When tension χ exceeds θ a crisis of D years breaks out; it cannot repeat within 15 years (the last one was the 2020 pandemic).
Parameters
Every parameter has a central value, a range and a source. When there is no direct source, we mark it as an assumption.
| Symbol | What it is | Central value | Range | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Maximum yearly capability growth (orders of magnitude) | 0.653 | 0.602 – 0.699 | Epoch AI, 2024 | |
| Minimum yearly growth: hardware improvement only | 0.13 | 0.0969 – 0.161 | Epoch AI, 2023 | |
| Capability ceiling (orders of magnitude above 2026) | 12 | 9 – 15 | Assumption | |
| Slowdown caused by a crisis | 0.7 | 0.5 – 0.9 | Assumption | |
| Automatable tasks in 2026 | 0.05 | 0.02 – 0.1 | Eloundou, Manning, Mishkin y Rock, 2023 | |
| Maximum automatable tasks | 0.98 | — | Assumption | |
| Steepness of the automation curve | 2 | 1.5 – 3 | Assumption | |
| Capability at which half of all tasks are automated | 6.5 | 4.5 – 9 | Grace et al., 2024 | |
| Working-age population in employment, 2026 | 0.58 | 0.56 – 0.6 | Organización Internacional del Trabajo, 2025 | |
| Displacement offset without peace | 0.3 | 0.2 – 0.4 | Acemoglu y Restrepo, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2019 | |
| Displacement offset with full peace | 0.8 | 0.7 – 0.9 | Acemoglu y Restrepo, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2019 | |
| Global inequality in 2026 (Gini × 100) | 60 | 57 – 63 | Milanovic, World Development, 2024 | |
| Inequality added by unregulated automation | 30 | 20 – 40 | Assumption | |
| Inequality corrected by redistribution | 25 | 15 – 35 | Assumption | |
| Robots in operation in 2026 (billions) | 0.0051 | 0.0047 – 0.0056 | International Federation of Robotics, 2024 | |
| Yearly robot growth at the historical pace | 0.12 | 0.1 – 0.14 | International Federation of Robotics, 2024 | |
| Maximum yearly robot growth | 0.35 | 0.3 – 0.4 | Assumption | |
| Robots per unit of automation (billions) | 10 | 2 – 20 | Assumption | |
| Science speed-up per order of magnitude of AI | 1 | 0.5 – 1.5 | Assumption | |
| Data-center electricity in 2026 (TWh) | 550 | 480 – 620 | Agencia Internacional de la Energía, 2025 | |
| Extra electricity per order of magnitude of AI | 0.2 | 0.15 – 0.3 | Agencia Internacional de la Energía, 2025 | |
| Yearly data-center efficiency gain | 0.02 | 0.01 – 0.04 | Assumption | |
| World primary energy in 2026 (EJ) | 620 | 600 – 640 | Energy Institute, 2024 | |
| Yearly energy-demand growth with slow AI | 0.004 | 0.001 – 0.007 | Assumption | |
| Yearly energy-demand growth with fast AI | 0.016 | 0.013 – 0.019 | Assumption | |
| Clean share of primary energy in 2026 | 0.19 | 0.17 – 0.21 | Energy Institute, 2024 | |
| Baseline speed of the energy transition | 0.05 | 0.03 – 0.08 | Assumption | |
| Boost from science to the transition | 0.3 | 0.1 – 0.5 | Assumption | |
| Fossil CO₂ emissions in 2026 (Gt) | 37.4 | 36 – 39 | Global Carbon Project, 2024 | |
| Land-use emissions in 2026 (Gt) | 4.2 | 3.2 – 5.2 | Global Carbon Project, 2024 | |
| Yearly decline of land-use emissions | 0.02 | 0.01 – 0.04 | Assumption | |
| Warming in 2026 (°C above pre-industrial) | 1.4 | 1.3 – 1.5 | Forster et al., Earth System Science Data, 2024 | |
| Warming per 1000 Gt of CO₂ (°C) | 0.45 | 0.27 – 0.63 | IPCC, 2021 | |
| Deviation within the UN interval (±10% by 2100) | 0 | -1 – 1 | Naciones Unidas, 2024 | |
| Effect of science on population (health) | 0.01 | 0 – 0.03 | Assumption | |
| Power concentration in 2026 (index 0–100) | 50 | 40 – 60 | Assumption | |
| Concentration per order of magnitude of AI without peace | 6 | 3 – 9 | Assumption | |
| Deconcentration brought by peace | 10 | 5 – 15 | Assumption | |
| Baseline yearly risk (pandemics, nuclear war, natural) | 0.0008 | 0.0005 – 0.0011 | Karger et al., Forecasting Research Institute, 2023 | |
| Yearly risk from fast AI progress without peace | 0.01 | 0.006 – 0.014 | Karger et al., Forecasting Research Institute, 2023 | |
| Yearly risk from power concentration | 0.004 | 0.002 – 0.006 | Karger et al., Forecasting Research Institute, 2023 | |
| Tension threshold that triggers a crisis | 0.7 | 0.6 – 0.8 | Assumption | |
| Duration of a crisis (years) | 5 | 3 – 8 | Assumption |
Calibration
Before publishing, the model is checked against official figures. These are the targets and whether they are met:
- MetPeaceful frontier temperature 2081–2100, within SSP1-2.6Model value: 2.04 °C
- MetPause temperature 2081–2100, between SSP1-2.6 and SSP2-4.5Model value: 1.97 °C
- MetMatrix-center temperature 2081–2100, within SSP2-4.5Model value: 2.19 °C
- MetRace temperature 2081–2100, between SSP2-4.5 and SSP5-8.5Model value: 2.61 °C
- MetFracture temperature 2081–2100, between SSP2-4.5 and SSP5-8.5Model value: 2.36 °C
- MetRace and Fracture end warmer than Peaceful frontier (difference in °C)Model value: 0.32 °C
- MetCatastrophe risk by 2100 at the center, between superforecasters (9%) and experts (20%)Model value: 17%
- MetCatastrophe risk by 2100 in Pause, below 9%Model value: 7.9%
- MetCatastrophe risk by 2100 in Race, above 20%Model value: 32.8%
- MetData-center electricity in 2030 at the center, ±30% of the IEA base case (945 TWh)Model value: 1,008.48 TWh
- MetYear half of all tasks are automated (center), between 2047 and 2116Model value: 2049
- MetPopulation in 2100 (center) within the UN intervalModel value: 10.28
- MetRobots 2016→2023 at the historical pace, ±15% of IFR’s 4.28 MModel value: 4.03
- MetCompute growth in the first year at full frontier, between ×4 and ×5Model value: 4.5
The risk thresholds (Pause below 9%, Race above 20%) are an editorial choice, anchored in the estimates of superforecasters and experts in the XPT tournament.
Limits of the model
- It does not predict: it links assumptions to consequences.
- Temperature only counts CO₂ and does not model carbon removal, so it never falls; at most, it levels off.
- Population does not react to catastrophes: risk is shown as a probability; the event itself is not simulated.
- The power and inequality indices are illustrative.
- The UN projects to 2100; after that we extend its last rate.
- The relationships between variables are simple on purpose, so they can be read and debated.